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## ADDRESS

T O T H E

## FREEHOLDERS of MIDDLESEX,

ASSEMBLED AT

#### FREE MASONS TAVERN,

IN GREAT QUEEN STREET,

Upon MONDAY the 20th of DECEMBER 1779,

BEING THE DAY APPOINTED FOR

A MEETING of the FREEHOLDERS,

FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING MEETINGS

TO MAINTAIN AND SUPPORT

## THE FREEDOM OF ELECTION.

De Bello Sabino cos referre; tanquam majus ullum populo Romano bellum fit, quam cum iis, qui legum ferendarum caufa creati, nihil juris in civitate reliquerint: qui comftia, qui annuos magistratus, qui vicissitudinem imperitandi (quod unum exæquandæ sit libertatis) sustulerint.

LIV. Lib. III. c. 39.

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Advertisement to the second Edition.

The present Impression does not materially differ from the original Paper, delivered to Mr. Townsend, and read in the presence of the assembled Freeholders, upon the 20th Inst.

A few Sentences, however, are inserted in the Text, and some Notes added, with a view of illustrating the principal design.

Dec. 30, 1779.

## TO THE

## CHAIRMAN

QF THE

# Freeholders of Middlesex, &c.

SIR,

HE professed design of your meeting, and the present alarming state of public affairs, induce me to submit the following sentiments to the judgement of Yourself, and the other Gentlemen assembled; presuming, if they appear to be sounded in reason, they will not be the less regarded, on account of their being suggested by an unknown individual\*.

2 The

<sup>\*</sup> It has been fuggested to the Author of these pages, that it is possible the Parliament may be dissolved, shortly after the expiration of the present recess. Such an apprehension, if justly founded, will probably operate upon the Counties, to press the necessity of a speedy inquiry into the expenditure of the Revenue, and incline them strongly to recommend the establishment of certain Economical regulations, of no little

The degree of attention, which ought in reafon to be paid by the Representative in Parliament to the Instructions of his Constituents, has, often been the subject of controversy. For my own part, I must freely confess, that in every instance, in which hitherto the sentiments of the Electors of Great Britain have been conveyed to the Elected, the latter may be justified, in paying no surther degree of attention to them, than the arguments, considered independently of the authority of the Persons instructing, or remonstrating, appear to deserve.

It has frequently been urged upon such occafions, that the person, thus instructed, ought to confider himself as the Representative of the Kingdom at large; and therefore, as not under a particular obligation to obey the instructions of the County, or Borough, which returns him: This argument, though frequently adopted for no very defensible

confequence to the well-being of the State. Such topics, as have a more immediate connection with our Political existence, will doubtless not escape their notice.

A People may be happy, when the persons, to whom the Crown confides the powers of Administration, act in a manner con-

formable to the high importance of the truft.

A People is free, when such constitutional checks exist, as render it impracticable for Ministers to betray the Public Cause.

The happiness of Englishmen ought not to depend upon the precarious virtue of a minister of State; they have a right to require, that it be founded on the solid basis of Parliamentary

independence.

I know some persons, who, if the opportunity, which now presents itself, of securing this important point, should be neglected, will be ready to exclaim, TIME WAS—Assum est de Libertate Anglicana.

purpose, is, in my apprehension, evidently founded in good fenfet.

+ The right of the Electors of Great Britain, to advise and instruct their Constituents, and the obligation which the latter /4/// are under, freely to communicate and confult with those, from whom they have received their power, are founded upon the justest principles-The practice is agreeable to immemorial ufage; and it would have been happy for this country, had fuch an intercourse more frequently prevailed. I only question the obligation of the Representative, to obey the Instructions of the particular District, or the Borough, which returns him, when his deference to the fentiments of other parts of the kingdom, the superior lights he may derive from his situation, or the dictates of his confcience, would incline him to purfue a different conduct.

The following cafe may explain and illustrate my meaning. Let us suppose that a Member of the Commons House of Parliament is instructed to declare his dissent, in case a Bill should be introduced, which has for its object the abolition of the Slave trade-a practice fo abhorrent from the dictates of humanity, and the principles of our Religion, that I make no feruple of affirming, with a very excellent citizen, and respectable writer, that it ought not to be tolerated in a Christian country.

Let us further suppose, that the majority of the Representatives of the people have also been instructed by their Constituents, to promote the introduction of a Bill, for its immediate

abolition.

Let us, lastly, suppose that the principles, on which such a Bill is founded, accord with the feelings, and the judgment of the member, who has received instructions to oppose it.

In these circumstances, I would ask, what is that line of conduct, which it would become such Member to pursue, who confiders himself as a Representative of all the Commons of Great Britain, and is willing to approve himself a friend to the rights of human kind?

Were the undue influence of the Crown abolished, an equal Representation established, and the duration of Parliaments reduced to the ancient annual period, the compliance of the Representative, with every reasonable with of his constituents, would be fufficiently fecured.

And

And with still greater appearance of reason may the Representatives of the Commons, actually assembled in Parliament, permit to lie neglected on their Table the Petition or Remonstrance of the most respectable, or most populous, County of the Kingdom, if the sentiments, contained in the said Petition or Remonstrance, be discordant with their own.

Partial interests, and a partial conception of the point in question, may with greater probability be supposed to prevail in a County Meeting, however respectable, than in the public Assembly of the Nation. A declaration of opinion, in the strongest language of Remonstrance, cannot be unlawful, and may frequently be expedient; and the Right of Petitioning is a Privilege, to which the obscurest individual is intitled. But to determine, to reject, or to redress, lies intirely in the Breast of the general Representative of the wholet.

But

<sup>+</sup> Every subject of this State is not only authorized, but by the Genius of English liberty he is encouraged and exhorted, freely to examine the defects of the Constitution—the errors of Government - and the conduct of the persons, employed in its various departments; and as freely to cenfure, wherever censure, in his judgement, shall be due. I am sometimes afraid, that the present inattention of the Nation, to affairs of State, is a symptom of its approaching dissolution. I wish to fee the ancient spirit of my countrymen revive-I wish to fee them a nation of Politicians, and the principle of the famous ordinance of Solon univerfally prevail. There are times, when it should be esteemed criminal in any person, arrived at years of discretion, not to have formed an opiniontreasonable, when a fair opportunity presents itself, not to propagate, and support his opinion, by the force of argument, and every legal method in his power. For

But if neither the Commons House of Parliament, nor any of its Members, are under an obligation to obey the instructions or commands of the persons who elect them, signified as such instructions have hitherto been, with less appearance of reason, can it be expected, that the opinions of the Freeholders of a County should influence the Crown.

The King, the House of Lords, and the Commons of this Country, equally and adequately represented in Parliament, are each of them to be regarded as absolutely free and independent\*.

While

For these and many other reasons, the usurped power of excluding the Subject from the Galleries of the Commons House of Parliament, more especially as exercised of late years, appears to me a direct violation of one of the most important privileges of the People. It deprives the Elector of the opportunity of hearing, what it highly concerns him to know; and diminishes the force of that falutary apprehension, in the mind of the Elected, which, in the midft of the temptations he is exposed to, has not unfrequently afforded confiderable assistance to his Virtue. It defrauds the true Patriot of part of his reward, and shelters the person of the base Betrayer of the Constitution, from deserved ignominy and disgrace; but I forbear.

The only reason offered in justification of this practice, that deserves the least attention, is founded upon the Idea, that foreign Powers may thus become more easily acquainted with our national concerns. But such reason would not hold, were the deliberations of the Commons House of Parliament conaned to the proper objects. I know it has been afferted, that this branch of the Legislature, of late years, has too frequent-

ly assumed the executive functions of government.

\* It was my intention, in using these strong expressions, to impress upon the minds of my countrymen an important truth, the right conception of which may have a confiderable influence upon their future conduct. Ву While the Conflitution subsists, the King cannot submit to the most distant idea of Coercion by one, or both of the other Branches of the Legislature; and consequently may, if he judges proper, reject the petition or remonstrance of a set of men, whose opinion, even the Commons House of Parliament is not under an obligation to regard.

By these expressions, however, I would be only understood to mean, that, in case any one of the three Divisions of the Legislature should refuse to comply with the inclinations of the other two, or should even be disposed to act in opposition to them, the combined portions are not invested, by the constitution, with any authority to compel the dissentient party to a concurrence with their measures, or legally to arraign its conduct.

The proper rights and functions of each of these powers, and the passions incident to human nature, when placed in certain circumstances, tend, however, to unite them, on every occasion, where the Public good requires their consent; and the same passions also tend to control, or moderate, their mutual actions, and effectually to prevent their union; when such union would obstruct the general welfare of the state. I readily acknowledge, that, in this sense, no Branch of the Legislature can be considered as free and independent. They all are subjected, equally with individuals, to those moral causes, which, in the most exalted state of Political liberty, with resistless energy, though frequently silent, and unobserved, control, direct and modify the actions of mankind.

But I here am speaking of the English constitution, accord-

ing to its model of perfection, not its present state.

Let any unprejudiced person consult the Political Disquisitions of the late excellent Mr. Burgh; let him attend to facts, which must have fallen within his proper knowledge; and she may possibly be inclined to doubt, whether an English House of Commons is in being at this instant. Let him turn his attention to the rising spirit of this much insulted Nation, and it is possible he may conceive, that the present is the moment for giving existence to such a Body; and that this might be effected, by measures persectly constitutional and pacific, This doctrine, I trust, will not be found in the least to militate against the acknowledged right of the people to new-model the Constitution, and to punish with exemplary rigour every person, with whom they have entrusted power, provided, in their opinion, he shall be found to have betrayed that trust.

I fpeak only of a period, when, from the acquiefcence of the people, it plainly appears to be their will, that the form of government, already established, should continue in existence.

Widely different from the prefent, would be the nature and energy of my expressions, were I treating of that folemn hour, when the delegates of a flate, chosen according to forms, which not law and cuftom, but necessity or expedience shall prescribe, and affembling for the purpose of inquiring into the abuse of power, shall sit in awful judgment upon the traiterous invaders of their rights. In fuch affembly alone, I acknowledge the Sovereign power to refide. To fuch alone, the tremendous name of MAJESTY may with propriety be attributed. And compared with its imperial jurifdiction, the prerogatives of the Crown, the fplendid privileges of the Nobles, and the authority of the Commons house of Parliament, either feparately confidered, or combined, are less than dust upon the scalet.

For

<sup>+</sup> Great advantage would be derived to the community, were our Fellow Citizens, of the lower classes, properly instructed in the just and constitutional meaning of such terms as the following, viz. Majesty—Subject—Sovereign—Republic—Loyalty—Allegiance—Treason—Prærogative—King's Bread—King's Armies

For the reasons above mentioned, and others to which I shall not at prefent call the attention of my Readers, the memorable petitions of the Freeholders of Middlesex, and of other Counties of England to the Crown, praying a dissolution of the Parliament, appear to have been very ill calculated to produce any falutary effect. To what purpose was it to prefer an ungrateful petition to a power, which you could not legally coerce? Men possessed of power are not disposed to part with it, upon the petition of the persons, who have declared themselves injured by its exertion. Such mode of feeking redrefs rather tends to perpetuate the grievances, of which we complain. It cannot be construed a breach of Privilege to affert, that the House of Commons of that day was an Engine of Oppression, worked by that very power, from which it was requested the destruction of it should proceed\*.

Whether

Whenever it is in contemplation, to offer a petition to a power, of whose friendly disposition a doubt is entertained,

Armies—My People, &c. We never can expect to behold a proper exertion of the natural good sense, and spirit of the Nation, until the understandings, and affections, of all orders of men, are emancipated from the influence of the salse ideas, which ignorance, or the art of designing Politicians have annexed to these expressions.

<sup>\*</sup> These Remonstrances of the Counties, so far as they were declarations of the opinion of the petitioning Parties, respecting the transaction here alluded to, were perfectly constitutional. The error consisted in requesting or expecting, as matters were then circumstanced, that the Crown would interfere in the dispute. There is a difference between an obligation strictly moral, and an obligation established by the fanctions of Municipal Law. There is also a difference between being obliged to receive a petition, and being obliged to comply with its prayer.

## [ 11 ]

Whether the same objections can reasonably be urged against the following measures, the wisdom of your Assembly must decide. I will state my idea with all the brevity and precision in my power.

As there is reason to believe that other Counties will soon follow your laudable example, in appointing Meetings, for the purpose of maintaining and supporting the Freedom of Election, it might not be improper for the County, which sets the glorious example, to draw the outlines of a regular plan, in which all the Counties, which may hereafter be disposed to pursue a similar line of conduct, may concur.

With a view of facilitating the execution of any important measure, hereafter to be adopted, it may be expedient to form a general estimate of the property, and of the number of the inhabitants, contained in each County, with a scale of the comparative consequence of the great commercial Cities, and of all the manufacturing Towns in the Kingdom; and from thence to form a calculation of the number of Deputies, which ought to be sent by each County, provided it should ever be thought requisite for them to conser upon a common cause‡.

The conduct of the English minister to a sister Kingdom will afford a comment to this doctrine.

the petitioning parties should always ask themselves the following question, viz. supposing our suit should be rejected, or passed over without notice, is it in our power to manifest such resentment, as may induce the rejecters to pay greater attention to a second application. If the parties petitioned apprehend, that the supplicants are possessed of such a power, they will, in all probability, attend even to the first request.

As foon as these numbers are ascertained, letthe idea be communicated to the assembled Gentlemen of the first County, or Counties, inclined to follow the example; and let it be submitted to their judgement, whether it would not be expedient to establish standing Committees, and to have respect to the aforesaid calculation, in their appointment. For instance; if the Middlesex Committee should consist of (ten) Members, the standing Committee of Yorkshire, Norfolk, Hampshire, Huntingdonshire, &c. should consist of a number, in some measure proportioned to the property, or population, of those counties.

It will doubtless appear an adviseable measure, after such standing Committees have been established, that they should communicate, from time to time, with each other, by their secretaries, and, by their joint and separate influence, endeavour to induce other Counties to follow their example; but it would, by no means, be expedient for them, to engage in the prosecution of any invariable plan, until it shall appear, that a majority of the landed and commercial interest in the Kingdom shall be willing to concur in one design.

When this moment is arrived, the Committees of each County might depute a proportionate number of their body, to confer upon a proper form of remonstrance to the Commons House of Parliament; in which may be set forth the grievance, the nature of the expected redress, with a subjoined demand of such redress, within a limited time.

## [ 13 ]

It may in the last place appear expedient, after a form of remonstrance has been approved by the Committees, that it should be properly authenticated, as the public ACT of the combined Counties. It would then be ready for prefentation at the Bar of the House, according to such solemnities, and with such attendance, as the laws may authorize, and the importance of the subject matter demand.

The objection that lay against the idea of a single County petitioning Parliament, or of all the Counties in succession, would here have no place. The Counties, thus remonstrating in combination, might justly assume a very different tone from the same Counties without such connection. The command would proceed from the Principal to the Delegate, from the Master to the Servant, against whom may be issued an immediate revocation of all discretionary powers, the moment it is perceived, that the concerns of the Principal are likely to suffer, through the want of honesty, or ability, in the person he employs.

The former Plea of the Delegate, that he is a representative of the Community at large, may be urged against him, for here the community at large requires his compliance.

It is also to be considered, that the Members of the House of Commons sit not in their own right, (like the King and Nobles), but as Proxies for others; and the Proxy ought in all reason be regarded as annihilated, when the voice of the Principal shall be thus distinctly heard.

The King, the Hereditary Nobility, and the Commons, form the Constitutional Legislature of this Country. The particular manner, in which the latter give their voice is a subordinate consideration. If they could affemble in person for this purpose, as was the case at Athens, and at Rome, the highest respect would be due to such transcendent authority: But as such mode is liable to very forcible objections, and indeed would be impracticable, the proper expedient is an equal and adequate reprefentation; and in fuch a reprefentative, whether it be convoked by ordinary or extraordinary forms, I apprehend every power and privilege, with which a Commons House of Parliament can be invested, do substantially reside+.

But let us imagine, for a moment, that an authority, thus respectable, on account of property and numbers, should not in this instance be obeyed.

The Perfons, delegated by the Committees to carry this Mandate to the House of Commons, report to the Bodies which deputed them, the Event of their remonstrance.

The

the present Electors.

I muf

<sup>+</sup> It is the proper end and aim of Representation, that the Interests of all classes and descriptions of men should, without respect of Parties, be effectually consulted, in the Public Ordinances of the Nation. Whether these interests may be best fecured, by attenling to property, or to numbers, is a question, which calls not for my prefent discussion.

Possibly, it may appear expedient, that to those Persons, who at present have no voice in the formation of the third division of the Legislature, should be conceded a power of electing a certain number, whose Voices may rank with the Votes of

The Committees affemble the Counties, and make a Report of their proceedings.

Under these circumstances, Persons of character and influence may arise in each County Assembly, and propose the Election of a new Committee, formed upon the same principles, but intrusted with more important powers\*: it may also be expedient to recommend a general association of the County, by the terms of which, the Parties lay themselves under a solemn Obligation, as Men of Honour, and Friends of their Country, to agree to, and support, every constitutional Measure, which the major part of the Committees shall think it expedient to propose, for the purpose of obtaining an effectual redress.

The

I must, however, consess, that, fince the circulation of the first impression of this tract, in consequence of having again perused an excellent publication, intitled, TAKE YOUR CHOICE, I am almost inclined to believe, that every person, who has a right to the appellation of Liber et legalis Homo, ought, by the principles of the constitution, to possess a vote, in the Election of a Representative in the Commons House of Parliament.

<sup>\*</sup> A proposition, expressive of this idea, might be conceived in the following terms.

<sup>&</sup>quot;That it is the fense of the Inhabitants of this county, that ( ) persons be appointed a committee (of safety) for the purpose of deliberating with the committees of likedisposed counties, upon the state of the nation—that the members of this committee be hereby authorized to exercise all such powers, as by immemorial usage do belong to the Members of the Commons House of Parliament—that they be also invested with the further power of affenting, in conjunction with the King and Hereditary Nobility, to such regulations, as may be proposed, for the purpose of establishing an equal and adequate representation of the People, in annual Parliaments, agreeable to the ancient constitution and customs of this Realm—and, lastly, that this commission shall terminate at the expiration of ( ) months."

The attention of the people will thus at length be excited—they will see before them a set of men, who are guiltless of the charge of having betrayed the most important of all trusts—an entire considence will be reposed in them by their Constituents - and the consciousness of this considence will give additional vigour to every refolution. Measures dictated by Patriotism, directed by Prudence, and supported by a sterner spirit of Perseverance, than hath hitherto been manifested, will be the unavoidable refult. What measures may be proper to be adopted, circumstances, with which every future hour will be pregnant, must determine. I will not presume, even in Idea, to anticipate, what may be thought expedient by the concentrated wifdom of an enlightened Peoplę.

I am however of opinion, that if such combined affemblies should in solemn council declare, that the present House of Commons was dissolved, such declaration would be truly constitutional, and that the requisite power would not be wanting to give validity to the decree.

I am also of opinion, that whatever regulations, respecting the mode of electing Representatives, and the forms of convoking future Parliaments in this kingdom, might be agreed upon in such convention, and should afterwards be assented to by the Nobles and the King, ought to be regarded as constitutional ordinances of the sovereign Power, until they are repealed by a similar authority; and that the acts of every future Parliament, convoked

in conformity to the regulations thus established, would have all the authority of law\*.

According to this idea, no unconstitutional coercion would be exerted against the remaining Branches of the Legislature; each would posses its proper Independency, and Freedom from external constraint; but would perhaps perceive it to be prudent to comply with the temperate claims, and wishes of the Commons. No other expedient would be necessary than the witholding of the supplies.

Thus might at length be obtained the bleffing of an equal and adequate representation, itself a sufficient remedy for all our evilst.

Thus,

<sup>\*</sup> The celebrated Junius, in a letter to Mr. Wilkes, expresses his doubts, whether the disfranchising of the Boroughs, could, de jure, be essected by an act of the Legislature, upon the general ground of improving the constitution. He demands, by what kind of reasoning it can be proved, that there is a power vested in the Representative, to destroy its immediate Constituent?

The principles advanced, and I trust, established, in this tract, will afford a satisfactory solution of this difficulty. They will, I hope, enable every Reader to discern, that those important and necessary regulations, which the present House of Commons may have neither the power, nor the disposition to enact, can, beyond all controversy, be established, by the paramount authority of an equal and adequate Representative, elected by the suffrages of All the People of England, for the very purpose in question.

<sup>‡</sup> It may reasonably be presumed, that the proposed meafures would be supported by the general concurrence of the hereditary Nobility of this kingdom; as every diminution of the present enormous influence of the Crown tends to restore, to that illustrious order of our fellow citizens, its proper dignity and constitutional importance.

<sup>†</sup> It lies not within the powers of my feeble Pen, to describe, in adequate language the various good effects, that in all probability

Thus, the Fabric of government, reared by our Ancestors, at the expence of so much labour and blood, would appear in finished Beauty, and the Popular Pillar of the Constitution, thus set upon its proper Basis, would give security and permanency to the whole\*.

I have

but like would be derived from this fource. One particularly frides me at this moment, which has not hitherto been fufficiently confidered; and, as its object is improvement in virtue,

I have the frien half virtue will attend to it.

As matters are circumstanced at present, the number of Persons is comparatively small, who can reasonably expect to obtain a Scal in that Assembly, which, if formed according to the Spirit of our Constitution, would be one of the most respectable assemblies upon Earth. But were the duration of Auritanients abridged—the Election of Members less open to under industrie—and a Plan of Rotation and equal Representation citabilities, many Youths of spirit and ability, animated by the prospect of the statering dustries, to which the free includified veloc of their follow-citizens might raise them, would found to diddin each meaner gratification, and feel within them sertiment. Thing responsive to the voice of Virtue, and of that bonest Pame, which, in the language of the Poet, Carmine pressor, anien occupat humanam.

I trust there is mere than one illustrious Senator, who fully can comprehend my meaning, and whose future rectitude of

conduct will verify my words.

What the incomparable Beccaria fays of an enflaved people in general, holds true also with respect to those, who find themselves encluded from bearing a part in framing the Laws and cirecting the Public Counsels of their Country. "Glž" uomini tehlavi sono più voluttuosi, più libertini, più crudelž degli aomini liberi. Questi meditano sulle scienze, meditano sugl'interessi della Nazione, veggono grandi oggetti, e gl" imitano; ma quegli contenti del giorno presente cercano ra lo su pito del libertiniggio una distrazione dall'annientamento, in cui si veggono."

Beccaria dei Delitti e delle Pene, p. 190.

The idea of an equal and adequate representation was, i.e. The us ago, proposed, and ably supported, in the House of Commons, by that intelligent and inflexible affector of English Fibertics, Mr. Wilkes.

Were

I have much to urge in confirmation of my opinion-I am aware of objections-and I am not unprepared to reply to them. But I mean not to trespass any further on your patience. I submit this general fketch of my prefent fentiments, with deference, to a fet of Gentlemen, who I trust understand the rights of their Fellow Citizens, and have already manifested a becoming spirit in their fupport.

The leading Principles of my Idea may be recapitulated in the following words.

Were the measure now adopted, a FŒDERAL UNION with the American States, productive of the greatest commercial, as well as other political advantages, would probably take place; and this perhaps at no very diffant period. Amidic the present disorders of our distempered state, they may possibly esteem it dangerous to be connected with a nation, so nearly

allied to perdition.

The arts, that have been used to inflame the minds of the People of England, against their Brethren on the other side of the Atlantic, have hitherto proved but too successful. I trust, however, they now begin to fail; and that a temper, more becoming the ancient generofity and humanity of our Nation, and more congenial to the spirit of the Religion we profess, will actuate our counsels. The great, the good Lr. Price has fo ably touched this subject, that it would be presumption in me to add any further reflexions of my own. 'To his found and catholic doctrine I subscribe with heart and hand.

The principal ideas, contained in the plan now proposed, have long been prefent to the mind of the writer. Strongry impressed with the persuasion, that an English House of Conmons, in order to its answering, in any degree, the purposes of its institution, ought to be a real Representation of the people, he fuggested to Sir George Saville his sentiments, respecting the necessity and the practicability of a reformation, in the fpring of the year 1776: communicating what is now made public, to that excellent citizen, in two private letters, under the fignature annexed to this address.

I am

I am alarmed when I recollect the Fate of former Remonstrances, in favour of the injured Rights of Election; and I am disposed to think, that, although Petitions from a majority of the counties, when acting single or unconnected, anight be rejected, greater respect would be paid to the remonstrance of the same Counties combined. As the voice of such majority would, strictly speaking, be the voice of the Commons of this country.

I am also inclined to wish, that the Freeholders of England, who are expected to assemble, in confequence of legal summons, in every part of the Kingdom, may steadily keep in view some one Constitutional Point—clear—distinct—and comprehensive in its nature—expressed in terms, adapted to the understandings of all orders of men—such as the intelligent and the virtuous of all parties will approve—and which, if attained, will not only render us an happy and an united people, but insure the enjoyment of every national advantage to our latest posterity\*.

Measures

tion of this country.

<sup>‡</sup> Ita dum finguli pugnant, universi vincuntur. Tacit. Agric.

<sup>\*</sup> The fingle measure, which, in my apprehension, would correspond, in every particular, to the characteristics above recited, is the Establishment of a Commons House of Parliament, in exact conformity to the primæval principles of the Constitu-

Unless the independency of this division of the Legislature be maintained, its existence can be but of little consequence to the People. It is surely a reasonable wish, and it ought to be the wish of every Englishman, that the Commons of this country may have their interests and inclinations consulted, and attended to, IN THEIR OWN HOUSE. In such circumstances, it would never be in the power of an abandoned administration, with its dependent tribes of placemen, pensioners and contractors, to riot unrestrained in the public plane.

Measures of extensive utility are generally plain and simple, and immediately approve themselves to the general sense of mankind; with respect to such therefore Unanimity may be expected.

It is also to be considered, that the same legal exertion of spirit, which, under the guidance of wisdom and moderation, would establish one point of comparatively small consequence, would secure to us the possession of the most important, beyond the influence of time and chance.

That the Friends of Liberty and of their Country should communicate with each other, and in all their resolutions, should look forward to futurity; appear to me to be maxims, strongly suggested by the complexion of the times.

I have only to add, that, when the times of diftrefs, long predicted, shall arrive, the requisite temper and prudence may be wanting for the conception of such schemes, as may be necessary for the salvation of our Country. But a plan may be proposed—may be deliberated upon—and in part affented to, in that hour of tranquillity which precedes the storm.

Salus Publica.

der—facrificing, with unbounded prodigality, at the shrine of despotism, the resources of the present generation, and the just inheritance of millions yet unborn; while discontent, distress, and disgrace prevail, in every part of this once glorious, happy, and extensive empire: or, to sum up in sew words, what would require many volumes in the detail, it would fellow as a consequence in immediate connection, that the Public would for ever be secured, against the treachery and insults OF ITS OWN SERVANTS.





